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Dear Members and Friends:

This is the first edition of the Upper Ohio Valley Historical Review that has been published since October of 1968. It is to be hoped that this will not be the last edition for another four years. However, it is only with your support, both moral and fiscal, that succeeding Journals can be printed. So, here's wishing both the Journal and the Society many happy returns on this renaissance.

Thanks are due to the following people for their contributions:

Mr. Robert K. Wright, Ph.D. candidate at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Va.

Miss Nancy Caldwell of Wellsburg and Mrs. George W. Leonard and Mr. George Leonard III of Cincinnati.

Mrs. Russell Hubbard of Wheeling.

Dr. Robert L. Larson, professor of history at West Liberty State College.

Dr. Kenneth N. Wyne, assistant professor of history at West Liberty State College.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Julia Pollock, editor
MURDER OF THE CROW GIRLS

This original manuscript is in the possession of the R. M. Hubbard family of Wheeling who are descendants of the Crow family mentioned in the following article.

Perhaps the most melancholy vengeance that ever took place on Wheeling Creek was the murder of three girls—the Miss Crows. Which occurred on the 1st day of May 1791.

The parents of these three poor girls lived on what is now called Crow Creek. And the following accords with statements made by the fourth girl who was an eye witness to the horrible tragedy and herself almost a victim.

On the day mentioned these girls left their home and started up the stream in search of their cows.

As they were going up the creek they met their brother Michael coming home. He wished his younger sister to return with him offering to let her ride on the horse with him.

But this she declined to do ( ) went on with the other girls. A ( ) as Mr. Crow started for home his (horse was) acting strangely and wanting to run (be) let him go at full speed. Scarcely had the brother disappeared when three Indians sprang from behind a large rock near where Mr. Crow and sisters had parted. Two of them taking the girls captive the third following Mr. Crow. But this one soon returned and a parley took place between them. Two of the savages being in favor of immediate slaughter the other wanting to carry them into permanent captivity. Unfortunately the arm of mercy was powerless and with uplifted tomahawk one of the Indians began the work of death.

One of the girls now made a desperate effort to get free and loosing the grip of the savage she started to run but was soon overtaken by the Indian and
and knocked down. The savage thinking her killed returned to where the others were to help finish the work of death. The girl who had been left for dead recovered from the blow looked back and saw one of the Indians tomahawk her sister Susan. At this she once more made an effort to get away and by running up a little ravine and hiding herself for some time behind a tree she was at last able to make her way home. And thrill her parents with the sad sad news. The Indians took scalps of the three girls and not being able to find the fourth hurriedly left. As they ran by a haw bush one of the scalps caught in its branches and the girls friends in search of them found it there. The friends fearing the Indians might be by (waiting) in ambush delayed searching until ( ) could be obtained when after much ( ) they persuaded several pers( ) with them. They found two of the girls where they had been killed. The Miss (Crow) had crawled nearly one hundred yards up the creek to get a drink and was yet there. One of her first questions were why did you not come sooner. She told her friends that while lying at the waters edge she had thought all those weary hours heard nothing save the rippling of the water and the wild turkeys gobbling around her. She was carried home on a sheet and the ( ) days. (Editor's note--The eldest of the Crow girls, Susan, planted a cedar tree from which a family member, Mr. James Carroll, made wooden toy watches for his descendants and friends in order that both be and the Crow girls' murder might be remembered.) And that sad sad story so long traditioned may not for years to come be found buried (sic) in oblivion.
GENERAL ISAAC HARDING DUVAL

This article on General Isaac H. Duval, a brigadier general in the West Virginia infantry during the Civil War, is interesting for its early western history of the general's career. Born in Wellsburg, W. Va., Duval was the great grandfather of Nancy Caldwell of Wellsburg and of her sister, Mrs. George W. Leonard of Cincinnati, co-authors with George Leonard III, of this article.

Isaac Harding Duval was born September 1, 1824 at Wellsburg, Virginia, the youngest son of Isaac Taylor and Sarah Harding Duval. He was educated in private schools in Wellsburg.

At the age of fourteen he left home taking passage on the steamer "Tempest," bound for Louisville, Kentucky, and from there shipped on the steamer "John Jay" for VanBuren, Arkansas, enroute to the home of his brother, Theron, who lived in Desha County, Arkansas.

For the next eight years he lived with and worked for his brother who had a mill (for grinding corn), a blacksmith shop, a store, and a race track on his farm. It was the center of attraction for a very large section of the countryside as it was situated on the road leading from Missouri to Texas about nineteen miles from VanBuren which was then a very small town. It also attracted the Indians as it was only four miles from the Cherokee Indian Nation.

The store or trading post was the only one for miles around. It was wonderful country for hunting with many buffalo, deer, elk, antelope, bears, wild horses and turkey and he became a very good hunter. He also learned to scout and fight Indians. When he was seventeen he bought a wagon and four yoke of oxen and went into business for himself burning and hauling lime. He also owned a good horse, saddle and bridle, together with some cattle and bogs.

The annexation of Texas gave to the United States many new and additional wards. This included the many Indian tribes who lived along the Texas borders and were all hostile.
President Polk appointed ex-Governor Butler of South Carolina and Colonel Lewis of Nashville, Tennessee, as commissioners to visit, collect and treat with the various Indian tribes. Isaac Harding, being a nephew of Butler, decided that this was his opportunity to see that part of the country and wrote requesting a position. He was accepted and joined the expedition at Fort Gibson in 1846.

The company was made up of fifty men and scouts. The supplies and the necessary presents for the Indians were transported by pack train. Invitations had been extended to some of the friendly Indian tribes to send representatives to accompany them. The Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw and Seminole Tribes accepted and their representatives were on hand. They left Fort Gibson in May of 1846, and crossed the Red River into Texas. Scouts were sent out to notify the Indians of their coming and the desire to make treaties. The treaty conference was to be held at a place called Comanche Peak.

Isaac was appointed Adjutant of the expedition and was in charge of all the equipment, keeping the roster of the company and the issuance of all necessary orders as directed by the Commissioners. Their troubles and hardships were many. They were attacked several times and many of their animals driven off by hostile Indians. Upon reaching their destination, they found only five representatives awaiting them and they did not have the power to enter into treaties.

The Commissioners decided it would take about four months to collect these representatives and return. Duval was given permission to take a party to help in rounding up these tribes. He selected three Indians whom he felt he could trust. One was a Cherokee, one a Delaware and the other a hostile. His party headed for Buffalo country. They met many bands of hostile Indians and had great difficulty in making them understand what they wanted. The Indians had no idea who or what the United States Government was and furthermore they did not care. However, he made contact with many tribes including the Comanches, Muscilaroids, and Kiowas who did agree to attend the conference.
He gathered up all the tribes he had contacted and estimated it would take him thirty days to get back to Comanche Peak. His company grew larger as the different tribes joined them and their rate of travel slowed until he was sure they would not get back in time. He sent his own men on to request that the Commissioners start at once to meet his party. He later wrote that as near as he could estimate there were between six and seven thousand Indians representing thirty tribes and at least fifteen thousand horses and mules. It must have been a grand sight to behold and he must have felt proud of the part that he had played in gathering them together and leading them to the meeting place. The Commissioners informed him that few tribes had shown up and if it had not been for the tribes he brought in, the conference would have been a failure.

During the talks the Commissioners decided that it was impossible to make the Indians understand the situation. They decided to take a delegation to Washington and permit them to see for themselves what they were being told was the truth. Thirty-two Indians promised to make the trip, but first they had to return to their tribes and make the necessary preparations.

The Indians soon began to arrive and in a few days the official party of three white men and twenty-eight Indians departed for New Orleans where they would go by boat to Cincinnati and from there overland to Washington. The Indians had never seen a steamboat and became panic-stricken. They were finally convinced that they would not be harmed. When they reached New Orleans, they were amazed at the great city and the ship and wharves. The Indians were convinced that Commissioner Butler had told them the truth at the treaty camp.

Duval left the party at Cincinnati because he had received a letter from Butler saying that he was having trouble settling his accounts in connection with the treaty expenses and he wanted Duval to go back to Texas and secure certain documents and certificates.
A short time after this he received a letter from Commissioner Butler informing him that he was joining a regiment in South Carolina for action in the Mexican War. He asked his nephew to go to his plantation on Red River near Shreveport, Louisiana, and take charge as of the first day of January, 1847. He managed the plantation until January, 1849, when he left to go to New Orleans intending to go into business. Unfortunately, cholera was raging that winter and business was at a standstill. The papers were full of the gold strike in California and he determined to go there.

He went to Texas and found that a place called Kaufman's Station, situated about twenty-five miles from Dallas, was the real starting place and that men were assembling there for the trip. A company of seventy-nine men were formed and much to his surprise he was elected Captain.

The company left Kaufman's Station and set out on a course due west with a pocket compass and a very poor map of the United States as their only guide. The hardships were many and often they were unable to locate water for days. They were attacked by the Indians many times. Enroute they passed through country with plenty of water, game and fish, plains with salt marshes where water and grass almost disappeared. At one point, due to the poor conditions of their horses, most of the command had to stop and wait until the horses were in shape to continue. They were one hundred and sixty-five days from the time they left Kaufman's Station in Texas until they camped their first night at Aqua Frio, the first place they dug gold in California.

Everything they ate was worth its weight in gold. Beef sold at one dollar and fifty cents a pound, salt was one dollar a pound, coffee twelve dollars a pound, sugar three dollars, molasses three dollars a pint and flour was one dollar a pound.

He said there was nothing more exciting then digging for gold and they worked what was called dry diggings and it was necessary to carry
the soil of the gold-bearing strata to the water of a nearby stream and wash it. His biggest find was a nugget worth about two hundred and fifty dollars.

He quit mining for a while and bought a mule train and began packing provisions into the mine fields. He had two Mexicans and seventeen mules to help him. He made quite a bit of money before he sold out and went back to mining gold. Most of his possessions and mementoes were lost in a fire that nearly destroyed Marysville, California. Shortly after this he went to San Francisco and found great excitement in regard to Cuba. Narciso Lopez had raised his standard for the Independence of Cuba and groups of volunteers were being formed to go and join him. Before they could sail, word reached them of the Venezuelan's capture and death and the end of the insurrection. He decided to return home and sailed on the steamer Oregon bound for Panama and from there to New Orleans where he took a steamer to Cincinnati and from there up the river to home. He had been away from his home and family for fourteen years.

After returning to Wellsburg, he engaged in the mercantile business. On June 22, 1853, he married Mary Deborah Kuhn. Ten children were born to them, five sons and five daughters. Two of his sons attended Linsly.

He entered the Federal Army on the first call for troops in 1861, enlisting in the First (West) Virginia Volunteer Infantry for three months and was elected Major. At the expiration of this term, he enlisted for three years and retained his command. On September 26, 1862, he was appointed Colonel in the Ninth (West) Virginia Infantry with which he saw most of his war service.

At its head he fought with Generals George Crook and Philip Sheridan in the Valley of Virginia. He was wounded twice and had eleven horses killed or wounded under him. All told, he took part in thirty-six battles.

When Lee surrendered, General T. L. Rosser tried to force his way west and continue the fight. In this he was defeated by Duval and Rosser's cavalry with several train loads of iron, leather, guns and other supplies was captured. Several thousand captives were proled when the fighting ended in the Staunton, Virginia area.
Because of meritorious conduct, he came out of the war with the stars of a brevet Major General and was a full Brigadier General.

After the war he held positions of honor and trust. He was elected to the West Virginia State Senate in 1866; Adjutant-General of West Virginia from 1867 to 1869; elected to a seat in Congress in 1868; served one term as Assessor of Internal Revenue; was Collector of same for twelve years; a member of the Legislature from Brooke County in 1889; and a West Virginia Commissioner to the Washington Inauguration Centennial in New York in 1889. He died in Wellsburg on July 10, 1902.
VIRGINIA 1861-1865: THE STATE RIGHTS PARADOX

The following paper grew out of a Civil War Seminar (1971-1972) under guest professor Robert Durden at the College of William and Mary. The author of the article, Mr. Robert K. Wright, is presently working on his Ph.D. in history at the College.

The relationship of the state of Virginia to the Confederate government during the Civil War presents an interesting paradox. Historians are quick to indicate that one of the difficulties which hampered the Confederacy in its fight for independence was the principle of state rights. The obstructionist tactics of Georgia and North Carolina, for example, caused the government of Jefferson Davis grave problems. Virginia, by contrast, exhibited a remarkable degree of cooperation. This cooperation is frequently explained by the presence of the Confederate government in Richmond and a greater awareness of the necessities of the hour due to her more exposed strategic position. Yet a portion of the state refused to secede and became the state of West Virginia in 1863.

It is incorrect to consider Virginia as a unified whole. Actually, there were five distinct geographical sections in 1861: Tidewater, Piedmont, the Valley of Virginia, north-west, and south-west. From the start the agriculturally richer Tidewater and Piedmont sections had developed in a fashion comparable to the other southern agricultural areas. This section became the locus of Virginia's slaveholding, contained the majority of the state's towns and cities, and was bound to the more southern states by geography and tradition. By 1861 the Valley had overcome most of its differences with the Plain, and thanks to the development of economic ties, it was displaying a growing sense of unity with the Plain.

The two sections west of the Blue Ridge Mountains were oriented more to the western states, and displayed a great hostility to the Eastern Plain during the first half of the century. Economic ties linked them to the Mississippi
Valley and to the north, rather than to the east. Inhabited by small farmers, slavery made little headway, and in fact declined between 1850 and 1860. The north-west was settled mostly by northerners, and thus was culturally different from the rest of the state. The south-west, although economically similar to the north-west, was much more closely tied by railroads to Richmond, and heavily southern in origin.

During the 1840's friction between the Eastern Plain and the younger sections mounted. The prime issue involved was the serious underrepresentation of the west in the state legislature. This internal crisis reached a peak at the state constitutional convention of 1850-1851, when the westerners threatened to split the state along the Blue Ridge Mountains if representation was not reformed. Disruption was avoided by a compromise designed to postpone the issue until 1865. One of the key figures in achieving this compromise was John Letcher of the Valley, a Jacksonian Democrat.

This settlement and emergence of the national issue of slavery submerged, but did not remove, sectional hostility. The gubernatorial election of 1859 revealed that sectional hostility was clearly an important factor in state politics. Letcher was able to defeat the radical State Rights Whig W. L. Goggin by playing upon the sectional divisions within the Whig party. Letcher's moderate stance had state-wide appeal, while Goggin's extreme position on slavery was unpopular with western Whigs.

This coalition of moderates came under increasing pressure in early 1861. Letcher denounced South Carolina's independent secession, but at the same time bowed to political necessity and strengthened the state's militia. In January he denounced extremists on both sides. Nonetheless, he did affirm the theoretical right of secession and gave warning that if a peaceful solution to the national crisis could not be reached, Virginia would join the other southern states.
On 14 February 1861 a convention met to discuss secession. It was initially dominated by a moderate and conservative coalition which lacked the organization and program of the radicals. Lincoln's maneuvers over Fort Sumter cut the ground out from under Letcher and on 17 April, in response to Lincoln's call for volunteers two days earlier, the convention voted to secede. Broken down sectionally, this vote was highly significant. Tidewater (23-6), Piedmont (32-4) and the south-west (18-3) favored the proposal, while the Valley (10-17) and the north-west (5-25) voted against it. The moderates had won an important concession, however, in requiring that secession had to be ratified by a referendum.6

While Letcher directed the state's secession in an orderly and legal manner, John S. Carlisle and Sherrard Clemens (who had campaigned for Letcher in 1859) led a walkout of unionist delegates on 19 April. The subsequent "First Wheeling Convention" (13-15 May) resolved to organize a provisional state government if secession was ratified by the People.7 On 23 May, by a six to one margin, the Ordinance of Secession was approved, although it was refected in the north-west three to one.8 The "Second Wheeling Convention" then met and disavowed the Ordinance, established the Reorganized Government of Virginia with Francis H. Pierpont as Governor, and August passed the long threatened dismemberment ordinance as a first step towards achieving statehood in 1863.

The south-west and the Valley both decided that their ties were with the Confederacy and enthusiastically supported the war. Davis appreciated Virginia's efforts, but cooperation was limited to the extent that Letcher could maintain his hegemony over the various factions within the state.9 By February of 1862 Virginia had supplied more men for the armies than any other state in the Confederacy.10
Several issues arose during 1862 in Virginia. Letcher felt that conscription was unconstitutional and unwise, but he defended it for the sake of unity. This was a striking contrast to the reaction of Governor Joseph Brown of Georgia. On 2 October 1862 the Legislature authorized compensated impressment of slaves as laborers, but the arrangement placed Letcher in the position of acting as an intermediary between the state and the Confederate governments. At the same time, opposition within the state forced him to adopt a moderate course in enforcing this act in order to achieve the maximum results with the minimum amount of friction.

Letcher had supported the maintenance of a ten thousand man separate state army to protect Virginia from any oversights by the Confederate government. It operated independently in the south-western portion of the state until 1863, but constant friction between its commander, General John E. Floyd, and the regular army did much to erode the initial good will of the south-west. Units refused to leave the south-west to go to the defense of Richmond, and deserters began flocking to the area. Enlistments in that section fell off abruptly, and since Letcher felt that conscription was unconstitutional, he did not assist in its enforcement.

By winter of 1862-1863 popular discontent, especially in the south-west, was growing. Although Letcher's leadership was progressively weakening, he was still able to hold the state in a policy of cooperation. Significantly, the Richmond press began to criticize the Davis administration following the 1862 military disasters of Fort Donelson and Roanoke Island.

During 1863 the problem in the south-west became critical as popular support for the war declined rapidly. Deserters from both armies sought refuge there and became the dominant force in portions of it, effectively chasing off or bushwacking officers sent by the Army to bring them back. Dr. Ella Lonn's
claim that by 1863 Virginia did not have sufficient popular support to keep its own men in the field, and that it fed deserters from other states passing through, is apparently based on this conduct by the south-west. 15

In the elections of 1863 Letcher was defeated in his bid for a seat in the Confederate Congress in a popular repudiation of his "overcooperation" with the Davis Administration. 16

Results revealed that Virginia followed generally the southern pattern of electing Whigs but at a lesser rate than average. 17 General William Smith, with a long state rights history, defeated General George Munford for Governor.

In his inaugural Address on 1 January 1864 Smith called for a greater effort to win the war. Specifically he attacked hoarding and profiteering but he also demanded a currency reform, reduced prices on consumer goods, and the establishment of an effective reserve force. He was reasonably cooperative with the Davis Administration and his policies of state rights were matters of principle rather than obsession. 18

During 1864 Smith complied with the Confederate Conscription Act of 1864 (although he opposed its passage) and made efforts to cooperate with the Davis Administration in the procurement of foodstuffs, cloth, and salt. Although he endeavored to alleviate the conditions of hardship in Virginia, he tried to do it without hurting the war effort of the Confederate government. In contrast to the behavior of states like North Carolina and Georgia, his degree of cooperation with the Confederate government was quite high. On the other hand, the state ranked third behind North Carolina and Georgia in the number of men exempted from the 1864 Conscription Act. 19

By September, 1864, south-west Virginia had become such a haven for deserters that the state began investigations. These revealed the existence of a secret organization, the "Order of the Heroes of America," which had ties
to similar organizations in the Carolinas. It had gained such control in this region of Virginia that it elected officers for the "State of Southwest Virginia." Collusion by Justices of the Peace, judges, and sheriffs encouraged desertion and draft evasion to the extent that conscription was unenforceable. Active aid to the Union by members of this organization rendered the south-west a distinct liability to the Confederacy by the winter of 1864. Smith found himself unable to cope with this problem and appealed to the Confederate government to assist him. Davis was equally unsuccessful. As a result, Confederate authority ceased to exist in south-west Virginia. By January, 1865, units raised in the south-west were literally evaporating.²⁰

Great contributions were made by Virginia to the Confederacy in men, material, and moral support. Yet she ranked third behind North Carolina and Tennessee in the number of officers (84) and men (12,071) who deserted.²¹ The solution to this seeming paradox is rather complicated, but can best be resolved by examining each of the five sections of the state. The bulk of support for secession, and later for the Confederacy, came from the two Eastern Plain sections (Tidewater and Piedmont). These were the wealthiest and most heavily slave counties, and their social and economic ties were with the south. As pressures grew and the state was pushed to the test in 1861, the radicals were able to persuade the majority that their interests lay with the south. By 1861 the Valley had grown close enough to the Eastern Plain that although they voted against secession, they supported the state and accepted the will of the majority. It is significant that Letcher, a valley man, was Governor during the crucial period and led the movement to cooperate with the Davis Administration.

The western part of the state was initially divided, but it soon proved to be hostile to the east. The north-west, being far more closely tied to the north, separated from the rest of the state in 1863. This movement was not so
much an expression of unionism as it was the logical culmination of the intra-
state sectional rivalry which had threatened separation twenty years earlier.
The south-west, with its slightly larger slave holdings and closer ties with
Richmond, was persuaded to join the east. But as soon as events, most not-
ably conscription and the dissolution of Floyd's force, convinced it that its
interests were not being served, it moved to a position of virtual independence
and hostility by 1864.\textsuperscript{22} It is this section and the "Heroes of America" that
were responsible for a great share of the desertions and make the state-wide
figures misleading.

The examples of Letcher and Smith are indicative of the three eastern sec-
tions. Faced with an exposed strategic position, this area of Virginia put
practical necessity before theory more than most, if not all, of the other Con-
federate states. This is not to say that these sections did not espouse the
state rights sentiments that plagued other states, but simply that they were
better able to appreciate the necessity to minimize them. The two western
sections did not feel such a community of interest and failed to support the
Confederacy.
FOOTNOTES


8. Wooster, Secession Conventions, p. 149; Curry, House Divided, p. 7.


21. Lonn, *Desertion During the Civil War*, p. 231.


As a best-selling de-mythologizing spoof of "The Great Man of the Revolution," Marvin Kitman's George Washington's Expense Account is a masterpiece of satire which purports to reduce the "Founding Father" to the human level of a man filing his income tax return.

Washington submitted his account for wartime expenses in 1783, and it was published in 1833. For one hundred and forty years the account was generally ignored by historians. Refusing a salary of $48,000.00, Washington turned in to the comptroller of the treasury an expense account totaling $449,261.51 for the eight years of the war, including $27,665.30 to defray the cost of Martha Washington's visit from Mount Vernon to Cambridge, Massachusetts. Also placed on the expense account were the services of Washington's slaves; a large bill for a well-stocked headquarters which included large quantities of Madeira wine; and nights on the town by his staff, dubbed by Kitman the "expense account crowd."

With a steady stream of sparkling humor which is maintained consistently throughout the greater part of the book, Kitman utilizes numerous anecdotes which have been gathered by Washington scholars over the years. To these he adds a combination of fanciful, clever, and sometimes purposefully ridiculous speculations about the meaning of numerous vague entries in the expense account. All of this is calculated to produce one of those books which advertisements usually describe as "you won't be able to put it down." Actually, it principally succeeds in producing a work which approximates the ideal set forth in Kitman's earlier book The Number One Best Seller. From a scholarly standpoint, however, it better fits the title of another of his works, You Can't Judge a Book by Its Cover.
Kitman credits Washington with being the father of the expense account. He maintains that Washington holds the record for expert expense account writing, having utilized forty-two of the forty-three basic rules of this refined genre.

At the outset of the book Kitman calls attention to five rules of expense account writing: "(1) Omit nothing; (2) Be specific on the smaller expenditures and vague on the larger ones; (3) Whenever possible, intermingle personal and business expenses; (4) Pick up the check for one's associates; and (5) Above all, be reasonable. Know what the market will bear."

Satirically utilizing these principles, Kitman produces a metamorphosis of the technique of expense account writing into an art for writing a satirical pseudohistory. Thus, he has produced a literary version of the musical How to Succeed in Business Without Really Trying. His book would be more aptly entitled "How to Write a Historical Best Seller Without Really Researching."

Space precludes demonstrating how the five basic principles of outstanding expense account writing weave their way mischievously through the book. However, consideration of two of these will serve to illustrate the point: Omit nothing and Be specific on the smaller expenditures and vague on the larger ones.

First, regarding the principle Omit nothing, Kitman says, "When in doubt, charge anyway. Put it on the train to Westport, and see if it gets off." In applying this rule of writing expense accounts to the writing of history, Kitman includes numerous anecdotes about Washington culled over the years by both pro-Washington and revisionist scholars. He brings his ironic prowess to Olympian heights (or Perhaps Stygian depths would be more apropos) by including some long-discredited apocryphal stories, often salacious, intended to titillate the uninitiated reader. Thus, he goes into great detail about the absurdly slanderous scandal regarding Washington rowing across the Hudson every night during the summer of 1776 to sleep with a Tory spy named Mary Gibbons. Woven
through his analysis are frequent references to the drinking habits of Washington and the "expense account crowd," "The Great Man's" love of horses (said to be akin to the jet set's fixation with sports cars), his incredible stamina as a dancer, and the severity with which he enforced the military code.

Kitman's second principle of expense account writing is be specific on the smaller expenditures and vague on the larger ones. Translated into Kitman's literary technique, this means: be specific on the trivial facts of Washington's role in the Revolution and vague on supporting evidence for the principle thesis of the book. Thus, he draws heavily from Douglas S. Freeman's classic biography, *George Washington*, for details of Washington's life during the revolutionary war, and from W. E. Woodward's *George Washington: The Image and the Man*, but is abstruse in substantiating his implied thesis: namely, that Washington's expense account was exorbitant. In the section entitled "Financial Notes," Kitman states that reliable comparisons of currency date back only to 1820. Since Washington struggled with a wide variety of currencies circulating in the United States, he converted them into "lawful," or coin currencies. Kitman cites Jackson Turner Main's *The Social Structure of Revolutionary America* for a conversion of Spanish dollars into sterling and then glibly passes this off as being useful "for anybody who has access to a computer." A good line; but, more thorough research into sources available about wholesale prices during the revolutionary period would have yielded a more accurate statement of the value of the dollar without invoking the spectre of the omnipresent computer.

Finally, Kitman suggests, but does not clearly demonstrate, that Washington was paid in specie at the close of the war rather than in the almost valueless continental currency. This is a critical point, for by April 1781 depreciation had diminished the value of continental currency to a ratio of $1.00 in coin to $1.46.67. Further depreciation followed in the closing years of the war and during the Confederation period.
On balance, Kitman's book is a delightful satire designed for the reader to curl up with on a blustery January evening and relish the frailties of the revolutionary generation. As literature, George Washington's Expense Account is calculated to produce the type of belly laugh one derives from a James Thurber story. Nevertheless, Kitman deserves credit for treading on turf scrupulously given a wide berth by professional historians. Perhaps his book will inspire professionals to hazard the quagmire of revolutionary finance, a task almost akin to bushwhacking through the thicket of colonial New Jersey history. Hopefully, a more scholarly analysis of the expense account will be forthcoming as part of the comprehensive study of the public records of the American revolutionary era as suggested by Edward Papenfuse in the September 1971 *Historical Methods Newsletter*.

West Liberty State College

Kenneth R. Nodyne

West Virginia
Mr. Brown is author of twelve and co-author of three books having to do with white-Indian relations. For the most part Brown's friends are the trespassed upon-Indians, and the enemies the trespasser whites, whose aggressions were triggered by a combination of incredible greed, heartless indifference to human suffering and the calculated slaughter of both Indian and his closest ally, the buffalo. We can share certainly, a sense of revulsion over the Chivington massacre. Certainly the demise of the Southern Cheyennes on that blustery day in November 1868 brought about by the "courage" of Colonel Custer did the reputation of that colorful officer no good. Custer's come-uppance eight years later looks like a classic fulfillment of poetic justice. The white man's tricky diplomacy in playing off Indian factions against each other to purchase their land cheaply and the virtual wipe-out of the buffalo herds by 1883 are among other outrages committed against the lives and dignity of the Indian. Brown's heroes are many and fabled such as Cochise, Geronimo, Black Kettle, Red Cloud, Dull Knife, Satanta, Crazy Horses and Chief Joseph, last but not least.

Brown's book should superficially convince every right thinking American of our age that our ancestors of the 1870s were the worst kinds of racists whose record on Indian affairs make our dealings with the black man look like sheer benevolence itself. But not quite. He is patently guilty of special pleading and the rules relating to the objective evaluation of evidence practiced by the historical profession seem to have been held in abeyance here. The incidents and personalities presented have a one-dimensional aspect although here and there he demonstrates an ability such as with Satanta the Kiowa chief-
tain to make his people "to come to life." We have a reversal of the traditional good-guy/bad-guy syndrome. There are a few good fellows among the whites and devils among the Indians, but not very many. Things seem to be made to fit his pre-conceived pattern of the stereotyped white villain and the Indian "noble savage." Interestingly this was partly promoted by the author's heavy reliance upon government reports and documents which told the "straight story." Of course these same papers have resulted in entirely different stories based on entirely different purposes. The fact that the government can be condemned by its own evidence is irrelevant, the real issue is that the full story has not been told here. While much of Brown's account has become standard reading this overlooks the genuine agonizing among concerned whites from many segments of the political and cultural establishment.

There were whites who regarded the Indian with courtesy (and exploited him for commercial profit), many who were outraged at scandals in the Indian bureau, or who risked army careers to defend the Indian. President Grant's program was to give the important religious groups a large voice in helping to formulate and administer Indian policy, even though his own Indian commissioner did not have an entirely free hand. The amazing thing is that Grant with his military training did not completely repudiate the efforts of the humanitarians. Helen Hunt Jackson's A Century of Dishonor was probably a closer reflection of majority white sentiment than the traditional hostility shown the Indian. The Dawes Act was a serious attempt to give the Indian his patrimony, although as administered it gave the immediate benefits to land speculators and Oklahoma "Sooners."
A major villain "of the piece" basically overlooked by the author, was the division of responsibility for Indian affairs between the Department of Interior with its "soft sell" approach and the War Department with its dependence on "blood and iron." That the Interior Department administered its functions badly should not overlook the fundamentals of the problems, which was, like so many other issues, another political football. This doesn't justify corruption so much as to explain it.

In spite of the weaknesses and shortcomings of the book it is one which will serve some value to the general reader, even if its only effect would be to reduce his sense of cultural chauvinism. The fairly lively literary style is marred somewhat by the book's sentimentality which interferes with an objective analysis of the total problem. The Indian portraits are good but the absence of a single map in work where its presence would have helped put the narrative in its proper geographical setting is extremely unfortunate.

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